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With the development of high computational devices, deep neural networks (DNNs), in recent years, have
gained significant popularity in many Artificial Intelligence (AI) applications. However, previous efforts have
shown that DNNs were vulnerable to strategically modified samples, named adversarial examples. These
samples are generated with some imperceptible perturbations, but can fool the DNNs to give false predictions.
Inspired by the popularity of generating adversarial examples for image DNNs, research efforts on attacking
DNNs for textual applications emerges in recent years. However, existing perturbation methods for images
cannot be directly applied to texts as text data is discrete in nature. In this article, we review research works
that address this difference and generate textual adversarial examples on DNNs. We collect, select, summarize,
discuss and analyze these works in a comprehensive way and cover all the related information to make
the article self-contained. Finally, drawing on the reviewed literature, we provide further discussions and
suggestions on this topic.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are large neural networks whose architecture is organized as a series
of layers of neurons, each of which serves as the individual computing units. Neurons are connected
by links with different weights and biases and transmit the results of its activation function on its
inputs to the neurons of the next layer. Deep neural networks try to mimic the biological neural
networks of human brains to learn and build knowledge from examples. Thus they are shown
the strengths in dealing with complicated tasks that are not easily to be modelled as linear or
non-linear problems. Further more, empowered by continuous real-valued vector representations
(i.e., embeddings) they are good at handling data with various modalities, e.g., image, text, video
and audio.
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With the development of high computational devices, deep neural networks, in recent years have
gained significant popularity in many Artificial Intelligence (AI) communities such as Computer
Vision [66, 126], Natural Language Processing [18, 67], Web Mining [102, 149] and Game theory
[119]. However, the interpretability of deep neural networks is still unsatisfactory as they work
as black boxes, which means it is difficult to get intuitions from what each neuron exactly has
learned. One of the problems of the poor interpretability is evaluating the robustness of deep
neural networks. In recent years, research works [42, 132] used small unperceivable perturbations
to evaluate the robustness of deep neural networks and found that they are not robust to these
perturbations. Szegedy et al. [132] first evaluated the state-of-the-art deep neural networks used
for image classification with small generated perturbations on the input images. They found that
the image classifier were fooled with high probability, but human judgment is not affected. The
perturbed image pixels were named adversarial examples and this notation is later used to denote all
kinds of perturbed samples in a general manner. As the generation of adversarial examples is costly
and impractical in [132], Goodfellow et al. [42] proposed a fast generationmethodwhich popularized
this research topic (Section 3.1 provides further discussion on these works). Followed their works,
many research efforts have been made and the purposes of these works can be summarized as:
i) evaluating the deep neural networks by fooling them with unperceivable perturbations; ii)
intentionally changing the output of the deep neural networks; and iii) detecting the oversensitivity
and over-stability points of the deep neural networks and finding solutions to defense the attack.
Jia and Liang [55] are the first to consider adversarial example generation (or adversarial attack,
we will use these two expressions interchangeably hereafter) on deep neural networks for text-
based tasks (namely textual deep neural networks). Their work quickly gained research attention
in Natural Language Processing (NLP) community. However, due to intrinsic differences between
images and textual data, the adversarial attack methods on images cannot be directly applied to
the latter one. First of all, image data (e.g., pixel values) is continuous, but textual data is discrete.
Conventionally, we vectorize the texts before inputting them into the deep neural networks.
Traditional vectoring methods include leveraging term frequency and inverse document frequency,
and one-hot representation (details in Section 3.3). When applying gradient-based adversarial
attacks adopted from images on these representations, the generated adversarial examples are
invalid characters or word sequences [156]. One solution is to use word embeddings as the input of
deep neural networks. However, this will also generate words that can not be matched with any
words in the word embedding space [39]. Secondly, the perturbation of images are small change of
pixel values that are hard to be perceived by human eyes, thus humans can correctly classify the
images, showing the poor robustness of deep neural models. But for adversarial attack on texts,
small perturbations are easily perceptible. For example, replacement of characters or words would
generate invalid words or syntactically-incorrect sentences. Further, it would alter the semantics of
the sentence drastically. Therefore, the perturbations are easily to be perceived–in this case, even
human being cannot provide correct predictions.
To address the aforementioned differences and challenges, many attacking methods are proposed
since the pioneer work of Jia and Liang [55]. Despite the popularity of the topic in NLP community,
there is no comprehensive review paper that collect and summarize the efforts in this research
direction. There is a need for this kind of work that helps successive researchers and practitioners
to have an overview of these methods.
Related surveys and the differences to this survey. In [10], the authors presented compre-
hensive review on different classes of attacks and defenses against machine learning systems.
Specifically, they proposed a taxonomy for identifying and analyzing these attacks and applied
the attacks on a machine learning based application, i.e., a statistical spam filter, to illustrate the
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effectiveness of the attack and defense. This work targeted machine learning algorithms rather than
neural models. Inspired by [10], the authors in [36] reviewed the defences of adversarial attack in
the security point of view. The work is not limited to machine learning algorithms or neural models,
but a generic report about adversarial defenses on security related applications. The authors found
that existing security related defense works lack of clear motivations and explanations on how the
attacks are related to the real security problems and how the attack and defense are meaningfully
evaluated. Thus they established a taxonomy of motivations, constraints, and abilities for more
plausible adversaries. [15] provides a thorough overview of the evolution of the adversarial attack
research over the last ten years, and focuses on the research works from computer vision and cyber
security. The paper covers the works from pioneering non-deep leaning algorithms to recent deep
learning algorithms. It is also from the security point of view to provide detailed analysis on the
effect of the attacks and defenses. The authors of [81] reviewed the same problem in a data-driven
perspective. They analyzed the attacks and defenses according to the learning phases, i.e., the
training phase and test phase.
Unlike previous works that discuss generally on the attack methods on machine learning al-
gorithms, [154] focuses on the adversarial examples on deep learning models. It reviews current
research efforts on attacking various deep neural networks in different applications. The defense
methods are also extensively surveyed. However, they mainly discussed adversarial examples
for image classification and object recognition tasks. The work in [2] provides a comprehensive
review on the adversarial attacks on deep learning models used in computer vision tasks. It is
an application-driven survey that groups the attack methods according to the sub-tasks under
computer vision area. The article also comprehensively reports the works on the defense side, the
methods of which are mainly grouped into three categories.
All the mentioned works either target general overview of the attacks and defenses on machine
learning models or focus on specific domains such as computer vision and cyber security. Our work
differs with them that we specifically focus on the attacks and defenses on textual deep learning
models. Furthermore, we provide a comprehensive review that covers information from different
aspects to make this survey self-contained.
Papers selection. The papers we reviewd in this article are high quality papers selected from top
NLP and AI conferences, including ACL1, COLING2, NAACL3, EMNLP4, ICLR5, AAAI6 and IJCAI7.
Other than accepted papers in aforementioned conferences, we also consider good papers in e-Print
archive8, as it reflects the latest research outputs. We select papers from archive with three metrics:
paper quality, method novelty and the number of citations (optional9).
Contributions of this survey. The aim of this survey is to provide a comprehensive review on
the research efforts on generating adversarial examples on textual deep neural networks. It is
motivated by the drastically increasing attentions on this topic. This survey will serve researchers
and practitioners who are interested in attacking textual deep neural models. More broadly, it can
serve as a reference on how deep learning is applied in NLP community. We expect that the readers
1Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics
2International Conference on Computational Linguistics
3Annual Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics
4Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing
5International Conference on Learning Representations
6AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
7International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
8arXiv.org
9As the research topic emerges from 2017, we relax the citation number to over five if it is published more than one year. If
the paper has less than five citations, but is very recent and satisfies the other two metrics, we also include it in this paper.
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have some basic knowledge of the deep neural networks architectures, which are not the focus in
this article. To summarize, the key contributions of this survey are:
• We conduct a comprehensive review for adversarial attacks on textual deep neural models
and propose different classification schemes to organize the reviewed literature; this is the
first work of this kind;
• We provide all related information to make the survey self-contained and thus it is easy for
readers who have limited NLP knowledge to understand;
• We discuss some open issues, and identify some possible research directions in this research
field aims to build more robust textual deep learning models with the help of adversarial
examples.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:We introduce the preliminaries for adversarial
attacks on deep learning models in Section 2 including the taxonomy of adversarial attacks and
deep learning models used in NLP. In Section 3, we address the difference of attacking image data
and textual data and briefly reviewed exemplary works for attacking image DNN that inspired
their follow-ups in NLP. Section 4 first presents our classification on the literature and then gives
a detailed introduction to the state of the art. We discuss the defense strategies in Section 5 and
point out the open issues in Section 6. Finally, the article is concluded in Section 7.
2 OVERVIEW OF ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS AND DEEP LEARNING TECHNIQUES IN
NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING
Before we dive into the details of this survey, we start with an introduction to the general taxonomy
of adversarial attack on deep learning models. We also introduce the deep learning techniques and
their applications in natural language processing.
2.1 Adversarial Attacks on Deep Learning Models: The General Taxonomy
In this section, we provide the definitions of adversarial attacks and introduce different aspects
of the attacks, followed by the measurement of perturbations and the evaluation metrics of the
effectiveness of the attacks in a general manner that applies to any data modality.
2.1.1 Definitions.
• Deep Neural Network (DNN). A deep neural network (we use DNN and deep learning model
interchangeably hereafter) can be simply presented as a nonlinear function fθ : X → Y,
where X is the input features/attributes, Y is the output predictions that can be a discrete
set of classes or a sequence of objects. θ represents the DNN parameters and are learned
via gradient-based back-propagation during the model training. Best parameters would be
obtained by minimizing the the gap between the model’s prediction fθ (X) and the correct
label Y, where the gap is measured by loss function J (fθ (X),Y).
• Perturbations. Perturbations are intently created small noises that to be added to the original
input data examples in test stage, aiming to fool the deep learning models.
• Adversarial Examples. An adversarial example x′ is an example created via worst-case
perturbation of the input to a deep learning model. An ideal DNN would still assign correct
class y (in the case of classification task) to x′, while a victim DNNwould have high confidence
on wrong prediction of x′. x′ can be formalized as:
x′ = x + η, f (x) = y, x ∈ X (1)
f (x′) , y
or f (x′) = y′, y′ , y
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where η is the worst-case perturbation. The goal of the adversarial attack can be deviating
the label to incorrect one (f (x′) , y) or specified one (f (x′) = y′).
2.1.2 Threat Model. We adopt the definition of Threat Model for attacking DNN from [154]. In this
section, we discuss several aspects of the threat model.
• Model Knowledge. The adversarial examples can be generated using black-box or white-box
strategies in terms of the knowledge of the attacked DNN. Black-box attack is performed
when the architectures, parameters, loss function, activation functions and training data of
the DNN are not accessible. Adversarial examples are generated by directly accessing the test
dataset, or by querying the DNN and checking the output change. On the contrary, white-box
attack is based on the knowledge of certain aforementioned information of DNN.
• Target. The generated adversarial examples can change the output prediction to be incorrect
or to specific result as shown in Eq. (1). Compared to the un-targeted attack (f (x′) , y),
targeted attack (f (x′) = y′) is more strict as it not only changes the prediction, but also
enforces constraint on the output to generate specified prediction. For binary tasks, e.g.,
binary classification, un-targeted attack equals to the targeted attack.
• Granularity. The attack granularity refers to the level of data on which the adversarial
examples are generated from. For example, it is usually the image pixels for image data.
Regarding the textual data, it could be character, word, and sentence-level embedding. Section
3.3 will give further introduction on attack granularity for textual DNN.
• Motivation. Generating adversarial examples is motivated by two goals: attack and defense.
The attack aims to examine the robustness of the target DNN, while the defense takes a step
further utilizing generated adversarial examples to robustify the target DNN. Section 5 will
give more details.
2.1.3 Measurement. Two groups of measurements are required in the adversarial attack for i)
controlling the perturbations and ii) evaluating the effectiveness of the attack, respectively.
• Perturbation Constraint. As aforementioned, the perturbation η should not change the true
class label of the input - that is, an ideal DNN classifier, if we take classification as example,
will provide the same prediction on the adversarial example to the original example. η cannot
be too small as well, to avoid ending up with no affect on target DNNs. Ideally, effective
perturbation is the maximum value in a constrained range. [132] firstly put a constraint
that (x + η) ∈ [0, 1]n for image adversarial examples, ensuring the adversarial example has
the same range of pixel values as the original data [143]. [42] simplifies the solution and
use max norm to constrain η: | |η | |∞ ≤ ϵ . This was inspired by the intuitive observation
that a perturbation which does not change any specific pixel by more than some amount
ϵ cannot change the output class [143]. Using max-norm is sufficient enough for image
classification/object recognition tasks. Later on, other norms, e.g., L2 and L0, were used to
control the perturbation in attacking DNN in computer vision. Constraining η for textual
adversarial attack is somehow different. Section 3.3 will give more details.
• Attack Evaluation. Adversarial attacks are designed to degrade the performance of DNNs.
Therefore, evaluating the effectiveness of the attack is based on the performance metrics of
different tasks. For example, classification tasks has metrics such as accuracy, F1 score and
AUC score. We leave the metrics for different NLP as out-of-scope content in this article and
suggest readers refer to specific tasks for information.
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2.2 Deep Learning in NLP
Neural networks have been gaining increasing popularity in NLP community in recent years and
various DNN models have been adopted in different NLP tasks. Apart from the feed forward neural
networks and Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN), Recurrent/Recursive Neural Networks (RNN)
and their variants are the most common neural networks used in NLP, because of their natural
ability of handling sequences. In recent years, two important breakthroughs in deep learning
are brought into NLP. They are sequence-to-sequence learning [131] and attention modeling [8].
Reinforcement learning and generative models are also gained much popularity [152]. In this
section, we will briefly overview the DNN architectures and techniques applied in NLP that are
closely related to this survey. We suggest readers refer to detailed reviews of neural networks in
NLP in [101, 152].
2.2.1 Feed Forward Networks. Feed-forward network, in particular multi-layer perceptrons (MLP),
is the simplest neural network. It has several forward layers and each node in a layer connects
to each node in the following layer, making the network fully connected. MLP utilizes nonlinear
activation function to distinguish data that is not linearly separable. MLP works with fixed-sized
inputs and do not record the order of the elements. Thus it is mostly used in the tasks that can
be formed as supervised learning problems. In NLP, it can be used in any application. The major
drawback of feed forward networks in NLP is that it cannot handle well the text sequences in
which the word order matters.
As the feed forward network is easy to implement, there are various implementations and no
standard benchmark architecture worth examining. To evaluate the robustness of feed forward net-
work in NLP, adversarial examples are often generated for specific architectures in real applications.
For example, authors of [3, 45, 46] worked on the specified malware detection models.
2.2.2 Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) . Convolutional Neural Network contains convolutional
layers and pooling (down-sampling) layers and final fully-connected layer. Activation functions are
used to connect the down-sampled layer to the next convolutional layer or fully-connected layer.
CNN allows arbitrarily-sized inputs. Convolutional layer uses convolution operation to extract
meaningful local patterns of input. Pooling layer reduces the parameters and computation in the
network and it allows the network to be deeper and less-overfitting. Overall, CNN identifies local
predictors and combines them together to generate a fixed-sized vector for the inputs, which
contains the most or important informative aspects for the application task. In addition, it is
order-sensitive. Therefore, it excels in computer vision tasks and later is widely adopted in NLP
applications.
Yoon Kim [60] adopted CNN for sentence classification. He used Word2Vec to represent words
as input. Then the convolutional operation is limited to the direction of word sequence, rather than
the word embeddings. Multiple filters in pooling layers deal with the variable length of sentences.
The model demonstrated excellent performances on several benchmark datasets against multiple
state-of-the-art works. This work became a benchmark work of adopting CNN in NLP applications.
Zhang et al. [155] presented CNN for text classification at character level. They used one-hot
representation in alphabet for each of the character. To control the generalization error of the
proposed CNN, they additionally performed data augmentation by replacing words and phrases
with their synonyms. These two representative textual CNNs are evaluated via adversarial examples
in many applications [13, 30, 31, 35, 78].
2.2.3 Recurrent Neural Networks/ Recursive Neural Networks. Recurrent Neural Networks are neural
models adapted from feed-forward neural networks for learning mappings between sequential
inputs and outputs [116]. RNNs allows data with arbitrary length and it introduces cycles in their
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computational graph to model efficiently the influence of time [40]. The model does not suffer
from statistical estimation problems stemming from data sparsity and thus leads to impressive
performance in dealing with sequential data [37]. Recursive neural networks [38] extends recurrent
neural networks from sequences to tree, which respects the hierarchy of the language. In some
situations, backwards dependencies exist, which is in need for the backward analysis. Bi-directional
RNN thus was proposed for looking at sentences in both directions, forwards and backwards, using
two parallel RNN networks, and combining their outputs. Bengio et al. [14] is one of the first to
apply RNN in NLP. Specifically, they utilized RNN in language model, where the probability of a
sequence of words is computed in an recurrent manner. The input to RNN is the feature vectors for
all the preceding words, and the output is the conditional probability distribution over the output
vocabulary. Since RNN is a natural choice to model various kinds of sequential data, it has been
applied to many NLP tasks. Hence RNN has drawn great interest for adversarial attack [104].
RNN has many variants, among which Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network [51] gains the
most popularity. LSTM is a specific RNN that was designed to capture the long-term dependencies. In
LSTM, the hidden state are computed through combination of three gates, i.e., input gate, forget gate
and output gate, that control information flow drawing on the logistic function. LSTM networks have
subsequently proved to be more effective than conventional RNNs [44]. GRUs is a simplified version
of LSTM that it only consists two gates, thus it is more efficient in terms of training and prediction.
Some popular LSTM variants are proposed to solve various NLP tasks [23, 23, 51, 112, 133, 141, 146].
These representative works received the interests of evaluation with adversarial examples recently
[35, 54, 55, 92, 104, 112, 118, 130, 156].
2.2.4 Sequence-to-Sequence Learning (Seq2Seq) Models. Sequence-to-sequence learning (Seq2Seq)
[131] is one of the important breakthroughs in deep learning and is now widely used for NLP
applications. Seq2Seq model has the superior capacity to generate another sequence information for
a given sequence information with an encoder-decoder architecture [77]. Usually, a Seq2Seq model
consists of two recurrent neural networks: an encoder that processes the input and compresses
it into a vector representation, a decoder that predicts the output. Latent Variable Hierarchical
Recurrent Encoder-Decoder (VHRED)model [122] is a recently popular Seq2Seqmodel that generate
sequences leveraging the complex dependencies between subsequences. [25] is one of the first
neural machine translation (NMT) model that adopt the Seq2Seq model. OpenNMT [64], a Seq2Seq
NMT model proposed recently, becomes one of the benchmark works in NMT. As they are adopted
and applied widely, attack works also emerge [24, 31, 99, 127].
2.2.5 Attention Models. Attention mechanism [9] is another breakthrough in deep leaning. It was
initially developed to overcome the difficulty of encoding a long sequence required in Seq2Seq mod-
els [77]. Attention allows the decoder to look back on the hidden states of the source sequence. The
hidden states then provide a weighted average as additional input to the decoder. This mechanism
pays attention on informative parts of the sequence. Rather than looking at the input sequence
in vanilla attention models, self-attention [136] in NLP is used to look at the surrounding words
in a sequence to obtain more contextually sensitive word representations [152]. BiDAF [121] is
a bidirectional attention flow mechanism for machine comprehension and achieved outstanding
performance when proposed. [55, 127] evaluated the robustness of this model via adversarial
examples and became the first few works using adversarial examples for attacking textual DNNs.
Other attention-based DNNs [26, 108] also received adversarial attacks recently [30, 92].
2.2.6 Reinforcement Learning Models. Reinforcement learning trains an agent by giving a reward
after agents performing discrete actions. In NLP, reinforcement learning framework usually consist
of an agent (a DNN), a policy (guiding action) and a reward. The agent picks an action (e.g.,
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predicting next word in a sequence) based on a policy, then updates its internal state accordingly,
until arriving the end of the sequence where a reward is calculated. Reinforcement learning requires
proper handling of the action and the states, which may limit the expressive power and learning
capacity of the models [152]. But it gains much interests in task-oriented dialogue systems [75] as
they share the fundamental principle as decision making processes. Limited works so far can be
found to attack the reinforcement learning model in NLP [99].
2.2.7 Deep Generative Models. In recent years, two powerful deep generative models, Generative
Adversarial Networks (GANs) [41] and Variational Auto-Encoders (VAEs) [63] are proposed and
gain much research attention. Generative models are able to generate realistic data that are very
similar to ground truth data in a latent space. In NLP field, they are used to generate textual data.
GANs [41] consist of two adversarial networks: a generator and a discriminator. Discriminator is
to discriminate the real and generated samples, while the generator is to generate realistic samples
that aims to fool the discriminator. GAN uses a min-max loss function to train two neural networks
simultaneously. VAEs consist of encoder and generator networks. Encoder encodes an input into a
latent space and the generator generates samples from the latent space. Deep generative models is
not easy to train and evaluate. Hence, these deficiencies hinder their wide usage in many real-world
applications [152]. Although they have been adopted in generating texts, so far no work examines
their robustness using adversarial examples.
3 FROM IMAGE TO TEXT
Adversarial attacks are originated from computer vision community. In this section, we introduce
representative works, discuss differences between attacking image data and textual data, and
present preliminary knowledge when performing adversarial attacks on textual DNNs.
3.1 Crafting Adversarial Examples: Inspiring Works in Computer Vision
Since adversarial examples are first proposed for attacking object recognition DNNs in computer
vision community [20, 42, 96, 105, 106, 132, 156], this research direction has been receiving sustained
attentions. We briefly introduce some works that inspired their followers in NLP community in
this section, allowing the reader to better understand the adversarial attacks on textual DNNs. For
comprehensive review of attack works in computer vision, please refer to [2].
L-BFGS. Szegedy et al. invented the adversarial examples notation [132]. They proposed a explic-
itly designed method to cause the model to give wrong prediction of adversarial input (x + η) for
image classification task. It came to solve the optimization problem:
η = argmin
η
λ | |η | |22 + J (x + η,y ′) s .t . (x + η) ∈ [0, 1], (2)
where y ′ is the target output of (x′ + η), but incorrect given an ideal classifier. J denotes the cost
function of the DNN and λ is a hyperparameter to balance the two parts of the equation. This
minimization was initially performed with a box-constrained Limited memory Broyden-Fletcher-
Goldfarb-Shanno (L-BFGS) algorithm and thus was named after it. The optimization was repeated
multiple times until reaching a minimum λ that satisfy Eq. (2).
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) . L-BFGS is very effective, but highly expensive - this inspired
Goodfellow et al. [42] to find a simplified solution. Instead of fixing y ′ and minimizing η in L-BFGS,
FGSM fixed size of η and maximized the cost (Eq. (3)). Then they linearized the problem with a
first-order Taylor series approximation (Eq. (4)), and got the closed-form solution of η (Eq. (5))
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[143]:
η = argmaxη J (x + η,y) s .t . | |η | |∞ ≤ ϵ, (3)
η = argmaxη J (x,y) + ηT∇x J (x,y) s .t . | |η | |∞ ≤ ϵ, (4)
η = ϵ · sign(∇x J (x, y)) (5)
where ϵ is a parameter set by attacker, controlling the perturbation’s magnitude. sign(x) is the sign
function which returns 1 when x > 0, and −1 when x < 0, otherwise returns 0. ∇x J (x, y) denotes
the gradient of loss function respect to the input, and can be calculated via back-propagation. FGSM
attracts the most follow-up works in NLP.
Jacobian Saliency Map Adversary (JSMA). Unlike FGSM using gradients to attack, Papernot
et al. [106] generated adversarial examples using forward derivatives (i.e., model Jacobian). This
method evaluates the neural model’s output sensitivity to each input component using its Jacobian
Matrix and gives greater control to adversaries given the perturbations. Jacobian matrices form
the adversarial saliency maps that rank each input component’s contribution to the adversarial
target. A perturbation is then selected from the maps. Thus the method was named Jacobian-based
Saliency Map Attack. The Jacobian matrix of a given x is given by:
JacbF [i, j] = ∂Fi
∂xj
(6)
where xi is the i-th component of the input and Fj is the j-th component of the output. Here F
denotes the logits (i.e., the inputs to the softmax function) layer. JF [i, j] measures the sensitivity of
Fj with respect to xi .
C&W Attack. Carlini and Wagner [20] aimed to evaluate the defensive distillation strategy [50]
for mitigating the adversarial attacks. They restricted the perturbations with lp norms where p
equals to 0, 2 and∞ and proposed seven versions of J for the following optimization problem:
η = argmin
η
| |η | |p + λJ (x + η,y ′) s .t . (x + η) ∈ [0, 1], (7)
and the formulation shares the same notation with aforementioned works.
DeepFool. DeepFool [96] is an iterative L2-regularized algorithm. The authors first assumed the
neural network is linear, thus they can separate the classes with a hyperplane. They simplified
the problem and found optimal solution based on this assumption and constructed adversarial
examples. To address the non-linearity fact of the neural network, they repeated the process until a
true adversarial example is found.
Substitute Attack. The above mentioned representative works are all white-box methods, which
require the full knowledge of the neural model’s parameters and structures. However, in practice,
it is not always possible for attackers to craft adversaries in white-box manner due to the limited
access to the model. The limitation was addressed by Papernot et al. [105] and they introduced a
black-box attack strategy: They trained a substitute model to approximate the decision boundaries
of the target model with the labels obtained by querying the target model. Then they conducted
white-box attack on this substitute and generate adversarial examples on the substitute. Specifically,
they adopted FSGM and JSMA in generating adversarial examples for the substitute DNN.
GAN-like Attack. There are another branch of black-box attack leverages the Generative Ad-
versarial Neural (GAN) models. Zhao et al. [156] firstly trained a generative model, WGAN, on
the training dataset X. WGAN could generate data points that follows the same distribution with
X. Then they separately trained an inverter to map data sample x to z in the latent dense space
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by minimizing the reconstruction error. Instead of perturbing x, they searched for adversaries z∗
in the neighbour of z in the latent space. Then they mapped z∗ back to x∗ and check if x∗ would
change the prediction. They introduced two search algorithms: iterative stochastic search and
hybrid shrinking search. The former one used expanding strategy that gradually expand the search
space, while the later one used shrinking strategy that starts from a wide range and recursively
tightens the upper bound of the search range.
3.2 Attacking Image DNNs vs Attacking Textual DNNs
To attack a textual DNN model, we cannot directly apply the approaches from the image DNN
attackers as there are three main differences between them:
• Discrete vs Continuous Inputs. Image inputs are continuous, typically the methods use Lp
normmeasures the distance between clean data point with the perturbed data point. However,
textual data is symbolic, thus discrete. It is hard to define the perturbations on texts. Carefully
designed variants or distance measurements for textual perturbations are required. Another
choice is to firstly map the textual data to continuous data, then adopt the attack method
from computer vision. We will give further discussion in Section 3.3.
• Perceivable vs Unperceivable. Small change of the image pixels usually can not be easily
perceived by human beings, hence the adversarial examples will not change the human
judgment, but only fool the DNN models. But small changes on texts, e.g., character or word
change, will easily be perceived, rendering the possibility of attack failure. For example,
the changes could be identified or corrected by spelling-check and grammar check before
inputting into textual DNN models. Therefore, it is nontrivial to find unperceivalble textual
adversaries.
• Semantic vs Semantic-less. In the case of images, small changes usually do not change the
semantics of the image as they are trivial and unperceivable. However, perturbation on texts
would easily change the semantics of a word and a sentence, thus can be easily detected
and heavily affect the model output. For example, deleting a negation word would change
the sentiment of a sentence. But this is not the case in computer vision where perturbing
individual pixels does not turn the image from a cat to another animal. Changing semantics of
the input is against the goal of adversarial attack that keep the correct prediction unchanged
while fooling an victim DNN.
Due to these differences, current state-of-the-art textual DNN attackers either carefully adjust
the methods from image DNN attackers by enforcing additional constraints, or propose novel
methods using different techniques.
3.3 Vectorizing Textual Inputs and Perturbation Measurements
Vectorizing Textual Input. DNN models require vectors as input, for image tasks, the normal
way is to use the pixel value to form the vectors/matrices as DNN input. But for textual models,
special operations are needed to transform the text into vectors. There are three main branches of
methods: word-count based encoding, one-hot encoding and dense encoding (or feature embedding)
and the later two are mostly used in DNN models of textual applications.
• Word-Count Based Encoding. Bag-of-words (BOW) method has the longest history in vec-
torizing text. In BOW model, an zero-encoded vector with length of the vocabulary size is
initialized. Then the dimension in vector is replaced by the count of corresponding word’s
appearance in the given sentence. Another word-count based encoding is to utilize the term
frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) of a word (term), and the dimension in the
vector is the TF-IDF value of the word.
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• One-hot Encoding. In one-hot encoding, a vector feature represents a token–a token could be
a character (character-level model) or a word (word-level model). For character-level one-hot
encoding, the representation can be formulated as [31]:
x = [(x11, ...x1n); ...(xm1, ...xmn)] (8)
where x be a text of L characters, xi j ∈ {0, 1} |A | and |A| is the alphabet (in some works, |A|
also include symbols). In Equation 8,m is the number of words, n is the maximum number
of characters for a word in sequence x. Thus each word has the same-fixed length of vector
representation and the length is decided by the maximum number of characters of the words.
For word-level one-hot encoding, following the above notations, the text x can be represented
as:
x = [(x1, ...,xm ,xm+1...xk )] (9)
where xi j ∈ {0, 1} |V | and |V | is the vocabulary, which contains all words in a corpus. k is
the maximum number of words allowed for a text, so that [(xm+1...xk )] is zero-paddings if
m + 1 < k . One-hot encoding produces vectors with only 0 and 1 values, where 1 indicates
the corresponding character/word appears in the sentence/paragraph, while 0 indicate it does
not appear. Thus one-hot encoding usually generates sparse vectors/matrices. DNNs have
proven to be very successful in learning values from the sparse representations as they can
learn more dense distributed representations from the one-hot vectors during the training
procedure.
• Dense Encoding. Comparing to one-hot encoding, dense encoding generates low dimensional
and distributed representations for textual data. Word2Vec citenips/MikolovSCCD13 uses
continuous bag-of-words (CBOW) and skip-grammodels to generate dense representation for
words, i.e., word embeddings. It is based on the distributional assumption that words appearing
within similar context possess similar meaning. Word embeddings, to some extend, alleviates
the discreteness and data-sparsity problems for vectorizing textual data [37]. Extensions of
word embeddings such as doc2vec and paragraph2vec [70] encode sentences/paragraphs to
dense vectors.
Perturbation Measurement. As described in Section 2.1.3, there needs a way to measure the
size of the perturbation, so that it can be controlled to ensure the ability of fooling the victim DNN
while remain unperceivable. However, the measurement in textual perturbations is drastically
different with the perturbations in image. Usually, the size of the perturbation is measured by the
distance between clean data x and its adversarial example x′. But in texts, the distance measurement
also need to consider the grammar correctness, syntax correctness and semantic-preservance. We
here list the measurements used in the reviewed in this survey.
• Norm-based measurement. Directly adopting norms such as Lp ,p ∈ 0, 1, 2,∞ requires the
input data are continuous. One solution is to use continuous and dense presentation (e.g.,
embedding) to represent the texts. But this usually results in invalid and incomprehensible
texts, that need to involve other constrains.
• Grammar and syntax related measurement. Ensuring the grammar or syntactic correctness
makes the adversarial examples not easily perceived.
– Grammar and syntax checker are used in some works to ensure the textual adversarial
examples generated are valid.
– Perplexity is usually used to measure the quality of a language model. In one reviewed
literature [92], the authors used perplexity to ensure the generated adversarial examples
(sentences) are valid.
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– Paraphrase is controlled and can be regarded as a type of adversarial example (4.3.3). When
perturbing, the validity of paraphrases is ensured in the generation process.
• Semantic-preserving measurement.Measuring semantic similarity/distance is often performed
onword vectors by adopting vectors’ similarity/distancemeasurements. Given twon-dimensional
word vectors p = (p1,p2, ...,pn) and q = (q1,q2, ...,qn):
– Euclidean Distance is a distance of two vectors in the Euclidean space:
d(p, q) = √(p1 − q1)2 + p2 − q2)2 + ..(pn − qn)2 (10)
– Cosine Similarity computes cosine value of the angle between the two vectors:
cos(p, q) =
∑n
i=1 pi × qi√∑n
i=1(pi )2 ×
√∑n
i=1(qi )2
(11)
• Edit-based measurement. Edit distance is a way of quantifying the minimum changes from one
string to the other. Different definitions of edit distance use different sets of string operations
[74].
– Levenshtein Distance uses insertion, removal and substitution operations.
– Word Mover’s Distance (WMD) [69] is an edit distance operated on word embedding. It
measures the minimum amount of distance that the embedded words of one document
need to travel to reach the embedded words of the other document [39]. The minimization
is formulated as:
min
∑n
i, j=1 Ti j | |ei − ej | |2 (12)
s .t .,
∑n
j=1 Ti j = di ,∀i ∈ {i, ...,n},
∑n
i=1 Ti j = d ′i ,∀j ∈ {i, ...,n}
where ei and ej ared word embedding of word i and word j respectively. n is the number of
words. T ∈ Rn×n be a flow matrix, where Ti j ≤ 0 denotes how much of word i in d travels
to word j in d′. d and d′ are normalized bag-of-words vectors of the source document and
target document respectively.
– Number of changes is a simple way to measure the edits and it is adopted in some reviewed
literature.
• Jaccard similarity coefficient is used for measuring similarity of finite sample sets utilising
intersection and union of the sets.
J (A,B) = |A ∩ B ||A ∪ B | (13)
In texts, A, B are two documents (or sentences). |A ∩ B | denotes the number of words appear
in both documents, |A ∪ B | refers to the number of unique words in total.
4 ATTACKING NEURAL MODELS IN NLP: STATE-OF-THE-ART
In this section, we first introduce the categories of attack methods on textual deep learning models
and then highlight the state-of-the-art research works, aiming to identify the most promising
advances in recent years.
4.1 Categories of Attack Methods on Textual Deep Learning Models
We categorize existing adversarial attack methods based on different criteria. Figure 1 generalizes
the categories.
In this article, five strategies are used to categorize the attack methods: i) By model access group
refers to the knowledge of attacked model when the attack is performed. In the following section,
we focus on the discussion using this categorization strategy. ii) By application group refers the
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Fig. 1. Categories of Adversarial Attack Methods on Textual Deep Learning Models
methods via different NLP applications. More detailed discussion will be provided in Section 4.5.
iii) By target group refers to the goal of the attack is enforcing incorrect prediction or targeting
specific results. iv) By granularity group considers on what granularity the model is attacked. v)
We have discussed the attacked DNNs in Section 2.2. In following sections, we will continuously
provide information about different categories that the methods belong to.
One important group of methods need to be noted is the cross-modal attacks, in which the
attacked model consider the tasks dealing with multi-modal data, e.g., image and text data. They
are not attacks for pure textual DNNs, hence we discuss this category of methods separately in
Section 4.4 in addition to white-box attacks in Section 4.2 and black-box attacks in Section 4.3.
4.2 White-Box Attack
In white-box attack, the attack requires the access to the model’s full information, including
architecture, parameters, loss functions, activation functions, input and output data. White-box
attacks typically approximate the worst-case attack for a particular model and input, incorporating
a set of perturbations. This adversary strategy is often very effective. In this section, we group
white-box attacks on textual DNNs into seven categories.
4.2.1 FGSM-based. FGSM is one of the first attack methods on images (Section 3.1). It gains many
follow-up works in attacking textual DNNs. TextFool [78] uses the concept of FGSM to approximate
the contribution of text items that possess significant contribution to the text classification task.
Instead of using sign of the cost gradient in FGSM, this work considers the magnitude. The authors
proposed three attacks: insertion,modification and removal. Specifically, they computed cost gradient
∆x J (f ,x , c ′) of each training sample x , employing back propagation, where f is the model function,
x is the original data sample, and c ′ is the target text class. Then they identified the characters
that contain the dimensions with the highest gradient magnitude and named them hot characters.
Phrases that contain enough hot characters and occur the most frequently are chosen as Hot
Training Phrases (HTPs). In the insertion strategy, adversarial examples are crafted by inserting
a few HTPs of the target class c ′ nearby the phrases with significant contribution to the original
class c . The authors further leveraged external sources like Wikipedia and forged fact to select
the valid and believable sentences. In the modification Strategy, the authors identified Hot Sample
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Phrase (HSP) to the current classification using similar way of identifying HTPs. Then they replaced
the characters in HTPs by common misspellings or characters visually similar. In the removal
strategy, the inessential adjective or adverb in HSPs are removed. The three strategies and their
combinations are evaluated on a CNN text classifier [155]. However, these methods are performed
manually, as mentioned by the authors.
The work in [117] adopted the same idea as TextFool, but it provides a removal-addition-
replacement strategy that firstly tries to remove the adverb (wi ) which contributed the most to the
text classification task (measured using loss gradient). If the output sentences in this step have
incorrect grammar, the method will insert a word pj beforewi . pj is selected from a candidate pool,
in which the synonyms and typos and genre specific keywords (identified via term frequency)
are candidate words. If the output cannot satisfy the highest cost gradient for all the pj , then the
method replaces wi with pj . The authors showed that their method is more effective than TextFool.
As the method ordered the words with their contribution ranking and crafted adversarial samples
according to the order, it is a greedy method that always get the minimum manipulation until
the output changes. To avoid being detected by the human eyes, the authors constrained the
replaced/added words to not affect the grammar and POS of the original words.
In malware detection, an portable executable (PE) is represented by binary vector {x1, ...,xm},
xi ∈ {0, 1} that using 1 and 0 to indicate the PE is present or not wherem is the number of PEs.
Using PEs’ vectors as features, malware detection DNNs can identify the malicious software. It
is not a typical textual application, but also targets discrete data, which share similar methods
with textual applications. The authors of [3] investigated the methods to generate binary-encoded
adversarial examples. To preserve the functionality of the adversarial examples, they incorporated
four bounding methods to craft perturbations. The first two methods adopt FSGMk [68], the multi-
step variant of FGSM, restricting the perturbations in a binary domain by introducing deterministic
rounding (dFGSMk ) and randomized rounding (rFGSMk ). These two bounding methods are similar
to L∞-ball constraints on images [42]. The third method multi-step Bit Gradient Ascent (BGAk ) sets
the bit of the j-th feature if the corresponding partial derivative of the loss is greater than or equal
to the loss gradient’s L2-norm divided by
√
m. The fourth method multi-step Bit Coordinate Ascent
(BCAk ) updates one bit in each step by considering the feature with the maximum corresponding
partial derivative of the loss. These two last methods actually visit multiple feasible vertices. The
work also proposed a adversarial learning framework aims to robustify the malware detection
model.
[114] also attacks malware detection DNNs. The authors made perturbations on the embedding
presentation of the binary sequences and reconstructed the perturbed examples to its binary
representation. Particularly, they appended a uniformly random sequence of bytes (payload) to
the original binary sequence. Then they embed the new binary to its embedding and performed
FGSM only on the embedding of the payload. The perturbation is performed iteratively until the
detector output incorrect prediction. Since the perturbation is only performed on payload, instead
of the input, this method will preserve the functionality of the malware. Finally, they reconstructed
adverse embedding to valid binary file by mapping the adversary embedding to its closest neighbour
in the valid embedding space.
Many works directly adopt FGSM for adversarial training, i.e., put it as regularizer when training
the model. We will discuss some representatives in Section 5.
4.2.2 JSMA-based. JSMA is another pioneer work on attacking neural models for image appli-
cations (refers to Section 3.1). The work [104] used forward derivative as JSMA to find the most
contributable sequence towards the adversary direction. The network’s Jacobian had been calcu-
lated by leveraging computational graph unfolding [97]. They crafted adversarial sequences for
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two types of RNN models whose output is categorical and sequential data respectively. For categor-
ical RNN, the adversarial examples are generated by considering the Jacobian JacbF [:, j] column
corresponding to one of the output components j. Specifically, for each word i , they identified the
direction of perturbation by:
sign(JacbF (x ′)[i,д(x ′)]) (14)
д(x ′) = argmax0,1(pj ) (15)
where pj is the output probability of the target class. As in JSMA, they instead to choose logit to
replace probability in this equation. They further projected the perturbed examples onto the closest
vector in the embedding space to get valid embedding. For sequential RNN, after computing the
Jacobian matrix, they altered the subset of input setps {i} with high Jacobian values JacbF [i, j] and
low Jacobian values JacbF [i,k] for k , j to achieve modification on a subset of output steps {j}.
[45] (and [46]) is the first work to attack neural malware detector. They firstly performed feature
engineering and obtained more than 545K static features for software applications. They used
binary indicator feature vector to represent an application. Then they crafted adversarial examples
on the input feature vectors by adopting JSMA: they computed gradient of model Jacobian to
estimate the perturbation direction. Later, the method chooses a perturbation η given input sample
that with maximal positive gradient into the target class. In particular, the perturbations are chosen
via index i , satisfying:
i = argmaxj ∈[1,m],Xj=y′ f ′y (Xj ) (16)
where y ′ is the target class, m is the number of features. On the binary feature vectors, the
perturbations are (0→ 1) or (1→ 0). This method preserves the functionality of the applications.
In order to ensure that modifications caused by the perturbations do not change the application
much, which will keep the malware application’s functionality complete, the authors used the L1
norm to bound the overall number of features modified, and further bound the number of features
to 20. In addition, the authors provided three methods to defense against the attacks, namely feature
reduction, distillation and adversarial training. They found adversarial training is the most effective
defense method.
4.2.3 C&W-based. The work in [130] adopted C&W method (refers to Section 3.1) for attacking
predictive models of medical records. The aim is to detect susceptible events and measurements in
each patient’s medical records, which provide guidance for the clinical usage. The authors used
standard LSTM as predictive model. Given the patient EHR data being presented by a matrix
X i ∈ Rd×ti (d is the number of medical features and ti is the time index of medical check), the
generation of the adversarial example is formulated as:
min
Xˆ
max{−ϵ, [loдit(x′)]y − [loдit(x)]y′} + λ | |x′ − x| |1 (17)
where loдit(·) denotes the logit layer output, λ is the regularization parameter which controls the L1
norm regularization,y ′ is the targeted label whiley is the original label. After generating adversarial
examples, the authors picked the optimal example according to their proposed evaluation scheme
that considers both the perturbation magnitude and the structure of the attacks. Finally they used
the adversarial example to compute the susceptibility score for the EHR as well as the cumulative
susceptibility score for different measurements.
Seq2Sick [24] attacked the seq2seqmodels using two targeted attacks: non-overlapping attack and
keywords attack. For non-overlapping attack, the authors aimed to generate adversarial sequences
that are entirely different from the original outputs. They proposed a hinge-like loss function that
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optimizes on the logit layer of the neural network:
|K |∑
i=1
min
t ∈[M ]
{mt (max{−ϵ,max
y,ki
{z(y)t } − z(ki )t })} (18)
where {st } are the original output sequence, {zt } indicates the logit layer outputs of the adversarial
example. For the keyword attack, targeted keywords are expected to appear in the output sequence.
The authors also put the optimization on the logit layer and tried to ensure that the targeted
keyword’s logit be the largest among all words. Further more, they defined mask functionm to
solve the keyword collision problem. The loss function then becomes:
Lkeywords =
|K |∑
i=1
min
t ∈[M ]
{mt (max{−ϵ,max
y,ki
{z(y)t } − z(ki )t })} (19)
where ki denotes the i-th word in output vocabulary. To ensure the generated word embedding is
valid, this work also considers two regularization methods: group lasso regularization to enforce
the group sparsity, and group gradient regularization to make adversaries are in the permissible
region of the embedding space.
4.2.4 Direction-based. HotFlip [31] performs atomic flip operations to generate adversarial ex-
amples. Instead of leveraging gradient of loss, HotFlip use the directional derivatives. Specifically,
HotFlip represents character-level operations, i.e., swap, insert and delete, as vectors in the input
space and estimated the change in loss by directional derivatives with respect to these vectors.
Specifically, given one-hot representation of inputs, a character flip in the j-th character of the i-th
word (a→b) can be represented by the vector:
−→v i jb = (0, ..; (0, ..(0, .. − 1, 0, .., 1, 0)j , ..0)i ; 0, ..) (20)
where -1 and 1 are in the corresponding positions for the a-th and b-th characters of the alphabet,
respectively. Then the best character swap can be found by maximizing a first-order approximation
of loss change via directional derivative along the operation vector:
max∇x J (x ,y)T · −→v i jb = max
i jv
∂J (b)
∂xi j
− ∂J
(a)
∂xi j
(21)
where J (x ,y) is the model’s loss function with input x and true output y. Similarly, insertion at
the j-th position of the i-th word can also be treated as a character flip, followed by more flips as
characters are shifted to the right until the end of the word. The character deletion is a number of
character flips as characters are shifted to the left. Using the beam search, HotFlip efficiently finds
the best directions for multiple flips.
The work [30] extended HotFlip by adding targeted attacks. Besides the swap, insertion and
deletion as provided in HotFlip, the authors proposed a controlled attack, which is to remove
a specific word from the output, and a targeted attack, which is to replace a specific word by
a chosen one. To achieve these attacks, they maximized the loss function J (x ,yt ) and minimize
J (x ,y ′t ), where t is the target word for the controlled attack, and t ′ is the word to replace t . Further,
they proposed three types of attacks that provide multiple modifications. In one-hot attack, they
manipulated all the words in the text with the best operation. In Greedy attack, they make another
forward and backward pass, in addition to picking the best operation from the whole text. In Beam
search attack, they replaced the search method in greedy with the beam search. In all the attacks
proposed in this work, the authors set threshold for the maximum number of changes, e.g., 20% of
characters are allowed to be changed.
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Strategy Work Granularity Target Attacked Models Perturb Ctrl. App.
FSGM-based
[78] character,word Y CNN [155] L∞ TC
[117] word N CNN [155] L∞, Grammar and POS
correctness
TC
[114] PE binary CNN in [27] Boundaries employ L∞
and L2
MAD
[3] PE embedding binary MalConv [110] L∞ MAD
JSMA-based [104] word embedding binary LSTM – TC[45, 46] application
features
binary Feed forward L1 MAD
C&W-based [130] medical features Y LSTM L1 MSP[24] word embedding Y OpenNMT-py [64] L2+gradient regulariza-
tion
TS, MT
Direction-based [31] character N CharCNN-LSTM[61]
– TC
[30] character Y CharCNN-LSTM
[26]
Number of changes MT
Attention-based [16] word, sentence N [29, 82, 140], CNN,
LSTM and ensem-
bles
Number of changes MRC,
QA
Reprogramming [98] word N CNN, LSTM,
Bi-LSTM
– TC
Hybrid [39] word embedding N CNN WMD TC, SA
Table 1. Summary of reviewed white-box attack methods. PE: portable executable; TC: text classification;
SA: sentiment analysis; TS: text summarisation; MT: machine translation MAD: malware detection; MSP:
Medical Status Prediction; MRC: machine reading comprehension; QA: question answering; WMD: Word
Mover’s Distance; –: not available.
4.2.5 Attention-based. [16] proposed two white-box attacks for the purpose of comparing the
robustness of CNN verses RNN. They leveraged the model’s internal attention distribution to find
the pivotal sentence which is assigned a larger weight by the model to derive the correct answer.
Then they exchanged the words which received the most attention with the randomly chosen
words in a known vocabulary. They also performed another white-box attack by removing the
whole sentence that gets the highest attention. Although they focused on attention-based models,
their attacks do not examine the attention mechanism itself, but solely leverages the outputs of the
attention component (i.e., attention score).
4.2.6 Reprogramming. [98] adopts adversarial reprogramming (AP) to attack sequence neural
classifiers. AP [32] is a recently proposed adversarial attack where a adversarial reprogramming
function дθ is trained to re-purpose the attacked DNN to perform a alternate task (e.g., question
classification to name classification) without modifying the DNN’s parameters. AP adopts idea
from transfer learning, but keeps the parameters unchanged. The authors in [98] proposed both
white-box and black-box attacks. In white-box, Gumbel-Softmax is applied to train дθ who can
work on discrete data. We discuss the black-box method later. They evaluated their methods on
various text classification tasks and confirmed the effectiveness of their methods.
4.2.7 Hybrid. Authors of the work [39] perturbed the input text on word embedding against the
CNN model. This is a general method that is applicable to most of the attack methods developed
for computer vision DNNs. The authors specifically applied FGSM and DeepFool. Directly applying
methods from computer vision would generate meaningless adversarial examples. To address this
issue, the authors rounded the adversarial examples to the nearest meaningful word vectors by
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using Word Mover’s Distance (WMD) as the distance measurements. The evaluations on sentiment
analysis and text classification datasets show that WMD is a qualified metric for controlling the
perturbations.
Summary of White-box Attack.We summarize the reviewed white-box attack works in Table
1. We highlight four aspects include granularity-on which level the attack is performed; target-
whether the method is target or un-target; the attacked model, perturbation control-methods to
control the size of the perturbation, and applications. It is worth noting that in binary classifications,
target and untarget methods show same effect, so we point out their target as ”binary" in the table.
4.3 Black-box Attack
Black-box attack does not require the details of the neural networks, but can access the input and
output. This type of attacks often rely on heuristics to generate adversarial examples, and it is more
practical as in many real-world applications the details of the DNN is a black box to the attacker. In
this article, we group black-box attacks on textual DNNs into five categories.
4.3.1 Concatenation Adversaries. [55] is the first work to attack reading comprehension systems.
The authors proposed concatenation adversaries, which is to append distracting but meaningless
sentences at the end of the paragraph. These distracting sentences do not change the semantics of
the paragraph and the question answers, but will fool the neural model. The distracting sentences
are either carefully-generated informative sentences or arbitrary sequence of words using a pool of
Fig. 2. Concatenation adversarial attack on reading comprehension DNN. After adding distracting sentences
(in blue) the answer changes from correct one (green) to incorrect one (red) [55].
DNN
Correct 
Output
Distorted 
Output
Incorrect 
Output
Paragraph 
Distracting 
contents
Fig. 3. General principle of concatenation adversaries. Correct output are often utilized to generate distorted
output, which later will be used to build distracting contents. Appending distracting contents to the original
paragraph as adversarial input to the attacked DNN and cause the attacked DNN produce incorrect output.
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Fig. 4. Edit adversarial attack on sentiment analysis DNN. After editing words (red), the prediction changes
from 100% of Negative to 89% of Positive [74].
20 random common words. Both perturbations were obtained by iteratively querying the neural
network until the output changes. Figure 2 illustrates an example from [55] that after adding
distracting sentences (in blue) the answer changes from correct one (green) to incorrect one (red).
The authors of [142] improved the work by varying the locations where the distracting sentences
are placed and expanding the set of fake answers for generating the distracting sentences, rendering
new adversarial examples that can help training more robust neural models. Also, the work [16]
utilized the distracting sentences to evaluate the robustness of their reading comprehension model.
Specifically, they use a pool of ten random common words in conjunction with all question words
and the words from all incorrect answer candidates to generate the distracting sentences. In this
work, a simple word-level black-box attack is also performed by replacing the most frequent words
via their synonyms. As aforementioned, the authors also provided two white-box strategies. Figure
3 illustrates the general workflow for concatenation attack. Correct output (i.e., answer in MRC
tasks) are often leveraged to generate distorted output, which later will be used to build distracting
contents. Appending distracting contents to the original paragraph as adversarial input to the
attacked DNN. The distracting contents will not distract human being and ideal DNNs, but can
make vulunerable DNNs to produce incorrect output.
4.3.2 Edit Adversaries. The work in [13] perturbed the input data of neural machine translation
applications in two ways: Synthetic, which performed the character order changes, such as swap,
middle random (i.e., randomly change orders of characters except the first and the last), fully random
(i.e., randomly change orders of all characters) and keyboard type. They also collected typos and
misspellings as adversaries. natural, leveraged the typos from the datasets. Furthermore, [99]
attacked the neural models for dialogue generation. They applied various perturbations in dialogue
context, namely Random Swap (randomly transposing neighboring tokens) and Stopword Dropout
(randomly removing stopwords), Paraphrasing (replacing words with their paraphrases), Grammar
Errors (e.g., changing a verb to the wrong tense) for the Should-Not-Change attacks, and the Add
DNN
Sentence
Word
Character
Text
Correct 
Output
Incorrect 
Output
Perturbation: 
Replace, Delete, Add, Swap…
Strategies to identify 
which to perturb
Adversarial Text
Fig. 5. General principle of edit adversaries. Perturbations are performed on sentences, words or characters
by edit strategies such as replace, delete, add and swap.
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Negation strategy (negates the root verb of the source input) and Antonym strategy (changes verbs,
adjectives, or adverbs to their antonyms) for Should-Change attacks. DeepWordBug [35] is a simple
method that uses character transformations to generate adversarial examples. The authors first
identified the important ‘tokens’, i.e., words or characters that affect the model prediction the most
by scoring functions developed by measuring the DNN classifier’s output. Then they modified the
identified tokens using four strategies: replace, delete, add and swap. The authors evaluated their
method on a variety of NLP tasks, e.g., text classification, sentiment analysis and spam detection.
[74] followed [35], refining the scoring function. Also this work provided white-box attack adopting
JSMA. One contribution of this work lies on the perturbations are restricted using four textual
similarity measurement: edit distance of text; Jaccard similarity coefficient; Euclidean distance on
word vector; and cosine similarity on word embedding. Their method had been evaluated only on
sentiment analysis task.
The authors in [92] proposed a method for automatically generating adversarial examples that
violate a set of given First-Order Logic constraints in natural language inference (NLI). They
proposed an inconsistency loss to measure the degree to which a set of sentences causes a model to
violate a rule. The adversarial example generation is the process for finding the mapping between
variables in rules to sentences that maximize the inconsistency loss and are composed by sentences
with a low perplexity (defined by a languagemodel). To generate low-perplexity adversarial sentence
examples, they used three edit perturbations: i) change one word in one of the input sentences; i)
remove one parse subtree from one of the input sentences; iii) insert one parse sub-tree from one
sentence in the corpus in the parse tree of the another sentence.
The work in [5] uses genetic algorithm (GA) for minimising the number of word replacement
from the original text, but at the same time can change the result of the attacked model. They
adopted crossover and mutation operations in GA to generate perturbations. The authors measured
the effectiveness of the word replacement accoding to the impact on attacked DNNs. Their attack
focused on sentiment analysis and textual entailment DNNs.
In [21], the authors proposed a framerwork for adversarial attack on Differentiable Neural
Computer (DNC). DNC is a computing machine with DNN as its central controller operating on an
external memory module for data processing. Their method uses two new automated and scalable
strategies to generate grammatically corret adversairal attacks in question answering domian,
utilising metamorphic transformation. The first strategy, Pick-n-Plug, consists of a pick operator
pick to draw adversarial sentences from a particular task (source task) and plug operator plug to
inject these sentences into a story from another task (target task), without changing its correct
answers. Another strategy, Pick-Permute-Plug, extends the adversarial capability of PPick-n-Plug
by an additional permute operator after picking sentences (gpick) from a source task. Words in a
particular adversarial sentence can be permuted with its synonyms to generate a wider range of
possible attacks.
4.3.3 Paraphrase-based Adversaries. SCPNs [54] produces a paraphrase of the given sentence with
desired syntax by inputting the sentence and a targeted syntactic form into an encoder-decoder
architecture. Specifically, the method first encodes the original sentence, then inputs the paraphrases
generated by back-translation and the targeted syntactic tree into the decoder, whose output is
the targeted paraphrase of the original sentence. One major contribution lies on the selection and
processing of the parse templates. The authors trained a parse generator separately from SCPNs
and selected 20 most frequent templates in PARANMT-50M. After generating paraphrases using the
selected parse templates, they further pruned non-sensible sentences by checking n-gram overlap
and paraphrastic similarity. The attacked classifier can correctly predict the label of the original
sentence but fails on its paraphrase, which is regarded as the adversarial example. SCPNs had been
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Fig. 6. General principle of paraphrase-based adversaries. Carefully designed (controlled) paraphrases are
regarded as adversarial examples, which fool DNN to produce incorrect output.
evaluated on sentiment analysis and textual entailment DNNs and showed significant impact on
the attacked models. Although this method use target strategy to generate adversarial examples, it
does not specify targeted output. Therefore, we group it to untarget attack. Furthermore, the work
in [127] used the idea of paraphrase generation techniques that create semantically equivalent
adversaries (SEA). They generated paraphrases of a input sentence x , and got predictions from f
until the original prediction is changed with considering the semantically equivalent to x ′ that is
1 if x is semantically equivalent to x ′ and 0 otherwise as shown in Eq.(22). After that, this work
proposes semantic-equivalent rule based method for generalizing these generated adversaries into
semantically equivalent rules in order to understand and fix the most impactful bug.
SEA(x, x′) = 1[SemEq(x ,x ′) ∧ f (x) , f (x′)] (22)
4.3.4 GAN-based Adversaries. Some works proposed to leverage Generative Adversarial Network
(GAN) [41] to generate adversaries [156]. The purpose of adopting GAN is to make the adversarial
examples mroe natural. In [156], the model proposed to generate adversarial exsamples consists
of two key components: a GAN, which generate fake data samples, and an inverter that maps
input x to its latent representation z ′). The two components are trained on the original input by
minimizing reconstruction error between original input and the adversarial examples. Perturbation
is performed in the latent dense space by identifying the perturbed sample zˆ in the neighborhood
of z ′. Two search approaches, namely iterative stochastic search and hybrid shrinking search, are
proposed to identify the proper zˆ. However, it requires querying the attacked model each time
to find the zˆ that can make the model give incorrect prediction. Therefore, this method is quite
time-consuming. The work is applicable to both image and textual data as it intrinsically eliminates
the problem raised by the discrete attribute of textual data. The authors evaluated their method on
three applications namely: textual entailment, machine translation and image classification.
4.3.5 Substitution. The work in [53] proposes a black-box framework that attacks RNN model for
malware detection. The framework consists of two models: one is a generative RNN, the other is a
substitute RNN. The generative RNN aims to generate adversarial API sequence from the malware’s
API sequence. It is based on the seq2seq model proposed in [131]. It particularly generates a small
piece of API sequence and inserts the sequence after the input sequence. The substitute RNN,
which is a bi-directional RNN with attention mechanism, is to mimic the behavior of the attacked
RNN. Therefore, generating adversarial examples will not query the original attacked RNN, but its
substitution. The substitute RNN is trained on both malware and benign sequences, as well as the
Gumbel-Softmax outputs of the generative RNN. Here, Gumbel-softmax is used to enable the joint
training of the two RNN models, because the original output of the generative RNN is discrete.
Specifically, it enables the gradient to be back-propagated from generative RNN to substitute RNN.
This method performs attack on API, which is represented as a one-hot vector, i.e., givenM APIs,
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Strategy Work Granularity Target Attacked Models Perturb
Ctrl.
App.
Concatenation [55] word N BiDAF, Match-LSTM – MRC[142] word, character N BiDAF+Self-Attn+ELMo
[109]
– MRC
[16] word, sentence N [29, 82, 140], CNN, LSTM and
ensembles
Number of
changes
MRC, QA
Edit
[13] character, word N Nematus [120], char2char
[71], charCNN [61]
– MT
[99] word, phrase N VHRED [123]+attn, RL in
[75], DynoNet [49]
– DA
[35] character, word N Word-level LSTM, Character-
level CNN
– SA, TC
[74] character, word N Word-level LSTM, Character-
level CNN
EdDist, JSC,
EuDistV, CSE
SA
[92] word, phrase N cBiLSTM, DAM, ESIM Perplexity NLI
[5] word N LSTM EuDistV SA, TE
[21] word, sentence N DNC – QA
Paraphrase-based [54] word N LSTM Syntax-ctrlparaphrase
SA and
TE
[127] word N BiDAF, Visual7W [157], fast-
Text [43]
Self-defined
semantic-
equivalency
MRC, SA,
VQA
GAN-based [156] word N LSTM, TreeLSTM, Google
Translate (En-to-Ge)
GAN-
constraints
TE, MT
Substitution [53] API N LSTM, BiLSTM and variants – MD
Reprogramming [98] word N CNN, LSTM, Bi-LSTM – TC
Table 2. Summary of reviewed black-box attackmethods.MRC:machine reading comprehension; QA: question
answering; VQA: visual question answering; DA: dialogue generation; TC: text classification; MT: machine
translation; SA: sentiment analysis; NLI: natural language inference; TE: textual entailment; MD: malware
detection. EdDist: edit distance of text, JSC: Jaccard similarity coeffcient, EuDistV: Euclidean distance on
word vector, CSE: cosine similarity on word embedding. ’-’: not available.
the vector for the i-th API is an M-dimensional binary vector that the i-th dimension is 1 while
other dimensions are 0s.
4.3.6 Reprogramming . As aforementioned, [98] provides both white-box and black-box attacks.We
describe black-box attack here. In black-box attack, the authors fomulated the sequence generation
as a reinforcement learning problem, and the adversarial reprogramming function дθ is the policy
network. Then they applied REINFORCE-based optimisation to train дθ .
Summary of Black-box Attack.We summarise the reviewed black-box attack works in Table 2.
We highlight four aspects include granularity-onwhich level the attack is performed; target-whether
the method is target or un-target; the attacked model, perturbation control, and applications.
4.4 Multi-modal Attacks
Some works attack DNNs that are dealing with cross-modal data. For example, the neural models
contain an internal component that performs image-to-text or speech-to-text conversion. Although
these attacks are not for pure textual data, we briefly introduce the representative ones for the
purpose of a comprehensive review.
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: April 2019.
Adversarial Attacks on Deep Learning Models in Natural Language Processing: A Survey 23
4.4.1 Image-to-Text. Image-to-text models is a class of techniques that generate textual description
for an image based on the semantic content of the latter.
Optical Character Recognition (OCR). Recognizing characters from images is a problem named
Optical Character Recognition (OCR). OCR is a multimodal learning task that takes an image as
input and output the recognized text. Authors in [129] proposed a white-box attack on OCR and
follow-up NLP applications. They firstly used the original text to render a clean image (conversion
DNNs). Then they found words in the text that have antonyms in WordNet and satisfy edit distance
threshold. Only the antonyms that are valid and keep semantic inconsistencies will be kept. Later,
the method locates the lines in the clean image containing the aforementioned words, which can
be replaced by their selected antonyms. The method then transforms the target word to target
sequence. Given the input/target images and sequences, the authors formed the generating of
adversarial example is an optimisation problem:
minω c · JCTC f (x′, t ′) + | |x − x′ | |22 (23)
x′ = (α · tanh(ω) + β)/2 (24)
α = (xmax − xmin)/2, β = (xmax + xmin)/2
JCTC (f (x, t)) = − logp(t |x) (25)
where f (x) is the neural system model, JCTC (·) is the Connectionist Temporal Classification (CTC)
loss function, x is the input image, t is the ground truth sequence, x′ is the adversarial example,
t ′ is the target sequence, ω,α , β are parameters controlling adversarial examples to satisfy the
box-constraint of x′ ∈ [xmin , xmax ]p , where p is the number of pixels ensuring valid x ′. After
generating adversarial examples, the method replaces the images of the corresponding lines in the
text image. The authors evaluated this method in three aspects: single word recognition, whole
document recognition, and NLP applications which based on the recognised text (sentiment analysis
and document categorisation specifically). They also addressed that the proposed method suffers
from limitatios such as low transferability across data and models, and physical unrelalizability.
Scene Text Recognition (STR). STR is also an image-to-text application. In STR, the entire image
is mapped to word strings directly. In contrast, the recognition in OCR is a pipeline process: first
segments the words to characters, then performs the recognition on single characters. AdaptiveAt-
tack [153] evaluated the possibility of performing adversarial attack for scene text recognition. The
authors proposed two attacks, namely basic attack and adaptive attack. Basic attack is similar to
the work in [129] and it also formulates the adversarial example generation as an optimisation
problem:
minω JCTC f (x′, t ′) + λD(x, x′) (26)
x′ = tanh(ω) (27)
where D(·) is Euclidean distance. The differences to [129] lie on the definition of x′ (Eq. (24)
vs Eq. (27)), and the distance measurement between x, x′ (L2 norm vs Euclidean distance), and
the parameter λ, which balances the importance of being adversarial example and close to the
original image. As searching for proper λ is quite time-consuming, the authors proposed another
method to adaptively find λ. They named this method Adaptive Attack, in which they defined
the likelihood of a sequential classification task following a Gaussian distribution and derived the
adaptive optimization for sequential adversarial examples as:
min | |x−x
′ | |22
λ21
+
JCTC f (x′,t ′)
λ22
+ log λ21 +T log λ22 +
1
λ22
(28)
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where λ1 and λ2 are two parameters to balance perturbation and CTC loss,T is the number of valid
paths given targeted sequential output. Adaptive Attack can be applied to generate adversarial
examples on both non-sequential and sequential classification problems. Here we only highlight the
equation for sequential data. The authors evaluated their proposed methods on tasks that targeting
the text insertion, deletion and substitution in output. The results demonstrated that Adaptive
Attack is much faster than basic attack.
Image Captioning. Image captioning is another multimodal learning task that takes an image as
input and generates a textual caption describing its visual contents. Show-and-Fool [22] generates
adversarial examples to attack the CNN-RNN based image captioning model. The CNN-RNN model
attacked uses a CNN as encoder for image feature extraction and a RNN as decoder for caption
generation. Show-and-Fool has two attack strategies: targeted caption (i.e., the generated caption
matches the target caption) and targeted keywords (i.e., the generated caption contains the targeted
keywords). In general, they formulated the two tasks using the following formulation:
minω c · J (x′) + | |x′ − x| |22 (29)
x′ = x + η
x = tanh (y), x′ = tanh (ω + y)
where c > 0 is a pre-specified regularization constant, η is the perturbation, ω,y are parameters
controlling x′ ∈ [−1, 1]. The difference between these two strategies is the definition of the loss
function J (·). For targeted caption strategy, provided the targeted caption as S = (S1, S2, ...St , ...SN ),
where St refers to the index of the t-th word in the vocabulary and N is the length of the caption,
the loss is formulated as:
JS,loдit (x′) = ∑N−1t=2 max{−ϵ,maxk,St {z(k )t } − z(St )t } (30)
where St is the target word, z(St )t is the logit of the target word. In fact, this method mininises the
difference between the maximumn logit except St , and the logit of St . For the targeted keywords
strategy, given the targeted keywords K := K1, ...,KM , the loss function is:
JK,loдit (x′) = ∑Mj=1mint ∈[N ]{max{−ϵ,maxk,Kj {z(k )t } − z(Kj )t }} (31)
The authors performed extensive experiments on Show-and-Tell [137] and varied the parameters in
the attacking loss. They found that Show-and-Fool is not only effective on attacking Show-and-Tell,
the CNN-RNN based image captioning model, but is also highly transferable to another model
Show-Attend-and-Tell [147].
Visual Question Answering (VQA). Given an image and a natural language question about the
image, VQA is to provide an accurate answer in natural language. The work in [148] proposed
a iterative optimisation method to attack two VQA models. The objective function proposed
maximises the probability of the target answer and unweights the preference of adversarial examples
with smaller distance to the original image when this distance is below a threshold. Specifically,
the objective contains three components. The first one is similar to Eq. (26), that replaces the loss
function to the loss of the VQA model and using | |x − x′ | |2/
√
N as distance between x′ and x.
The second component maximises the difference between the softmax output and the prediction
when it is different with the target answer. The third component ensures the distance between
x′ and x is under a lower bound. The attacks are evaluated by checking whether better success
rate is obtained over the previous attacks, and the confidence score of the model to predict the
target answer. Based on the evaluations, the authors concluded that that attention, bounding box
localization and compositional internal structures are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. This work
also attacked a image captioning neural model. We refer the original paper for further information.
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Multi-modal Application Work Target Access Attacked Models Perturb
Ctrl.
Image-to-Text
Optical Character Recognition [129] Y white-box Tesseract [135] L2, EdDist
Scene Text Recognition [153] Y white-box CRNN [124] L2
Image Captioning [22] Y white-box Show-and-Tell
[137]
L2
Visual Question Answering [148] Y white-box MCB [34], N2NMN
[52]
L2
Visual-Semantic Embeddings [125] N black-box VSE++ [33] –
Speech-to-Text Speech Recognition [19] Y white-box DeepSpeech [48] L2
Table 3. Summary of reviewed cross-modal attacks. EdDist: edit distance of text, -: not available.
Visual-Semantic Embeddings (VSE). The aim of VSE is to bridge natural language and the
underlying visual world. In VSE, the embedding spaces of both images and descriptive texts
(captions) are jointly optimized and aligned. [125] attacked the latest VSE model by generating
adversarial examples in the test set and evaluated the robustness of the VSEmodesls. They performed
the attack on textual part by introducing three method: i) replace nouns in the image captions
utilizing the hypernymy/hyponymy relations in WordNet; ii) change the numerals to different
ones and singularize or pluralize the corresponding nouns when necessary; iii) detect the relations
and shuffle the non-interchangeable noun phrases or replace the prepositions. This method can be
considered as a black-box edit adversary .
4.4.2 Speech-to-Text. Speech-to-text is also known as speech recognition. The task is to recognize
and translate the spoken language into text automatically. [19] attacked a state-of-the-art speech-to-
text transcription neural network (based on LSTM), named DeepSpeech. Given a natural waveform,
the authors constructed a audio perturbation that is almost inaudible but can be recognized by
adding into the original waveform. The perturbation is constructed by adopting the idea from
C&W method (refers to section 3.1 ), which measures the image distortion by the maximum
amount of changed pixels. Adapting this idea, they measured the audio distortion by calculating
relative loudness of an audio and proposed to use Connectionist Temporal Classification loss for
the optimization task. Then they solved this task with Adam optimizer [62].
4.5 Benchmark Datasets by Applications
In recent years, neural networks gain success in different NLP domains and the popular applications
include text classification, reading comprehension, machine translation, text summarization, ques-
tion answering, dialogue generation, to name a few. In this section, we review the current works
on generating adversarial examples on the neural networks in the perspective of NLP applications.
Table 4 summarizes the works we reviewed in this article according to their application domain. We
further list the benchmark datasets used in these works in the table as auxiliary information– thus
we refer readers to the links/references we collect for the detailed descriptions of the datasets. Note
that the auxiliary datasets which help to generate adversarial examples are not included. Instead,
we only present the dataset used to evaluate the attacked neural networks.
Text Classification.Majority of the surveyed works attack the deep neural networks for text
classification, since these tasks can be framed as a classification problem. Sentiment analysis aims
to classify the sentiment to several groups (e.g., in 3-group scheme: neural, positive and negative).
Gender identification, Grammatical error detection and malware detection can be framed as binary
classification problems. Relation extraction can be formulated as single or multi-classification
problem. Predict medical status is a multi-class problem that the classes are defined by medical
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Applications Representative Works Benchmark Datasets
Classification
Text Classification [31, 35, 39, 78, 98, 118] DBpedia, Reuters Newswires, AG’s
news, Sogou News, Yahoo! Answers,
RCV1, Surname Classification Dataset
Sentiment Analysis [31, 35, 54, 98, 104, 117, 118,
127]
SST, IMDB Review, Yelp Review, Elec,
Rotten Tomatoes Review, Amazon Re-
view, Arabic Tweets Sentiment
Spam Detection [35] Enron Spam, Datasets from [155]
Gender Identification [117] Twitter Gender
Grammar Error Detection [118] FCE-public
Medical Status Prediction [130] Electronic Health Records (EHR)
Malware Detection [4, 45, 46, 53, 114] DREBIN, Microsoft Kaggle
Relation Extraction [11, 145] NYT Relation, UW Relation, ACE04,
CoNLL04 EC, Dutch Real Estate Clas-
sifieds, Adverse Drug Events
Machine Translation [13, 24, 30, 156] TED Talks, WMT’16 Multimodal Trans-
lation Task
Machine Comprehension [16, 21, 55, 142] SQuAD, MovieQA Multiple Choice, Log-
ical QA
Text Summarization [24] DUC2003, DUC2004, Gigaword
Text Entailment [54, 57, 92, 156] SNLI, SciTail, MultiNLI, SICK
POS Tagging [151] WSJ portion of PTB, Treebanks in UD
Dialogue System [99] Ubuntu Dialogue, CoCoA,
Cross-model
Optical Character Recognition [129] Hillary Clinton’s emails
Scene Text Recognition [153] Street View Text, ICDAR 2013, IIIT5K
Image Captioning [22, 148] MSCOCO, Visual Genome
Visual Question Answering [148] Datasets from [6], Datasets from [157]
Visual-Semantic Embedding [125] MSCOCO
Speech Tecognition [19] Mozilla Common Voice
Table 4. Attacked Applications and Benchmark Datasets
experts. These works usually use multiple datasets to evaluate their attack strategies to show the
generality and robustness of their method. [78] used DBpedia ontology dataset [72] to classify the
document samples into 14 high-level classes. [39] used IMDB movie reviews [85] for sentiment
analysis, and Reuters-2 and Reuters-5 newswires dataset provided by NLTK package10 for cate-
gorization. [104] used a un-specified movie review dataset for sentiment analysis. [117] also used
IMDB movie review dataset for sentiment analysis. The work also performed gender classification
on and Twitter dataset11 for gender detection. [35] performed spam detection on Enron Spam
Dataset [91] and adopted six large datasets from [155], i.e., AG’s news12, Sogou news [138], DBPedia
ontology dataset, Yahoo! Answers13 for text categorization and Yelp reviews14, Amazon reviews
[90] for sentiment analysis. [31] also used AG’s news for text classification. Further, they used
Stanford Sentiment Treebank (SST) dataset [128] for sentiment analysis. [118] conducted evalu-
ation on three tasks: sentiment analysis (IMDB movie review, Elec [56], Rotten Tomatoes [103]),
text categorization (DBpedia Ontology dataset and RCV1 [73]) and grammatical error detection
(FCE-public [150]). [130] generated adversarial examples on the neural medical status prediction
10https://www.nltk.org/
11https://www.kaggle.com/crowdflower/twitter-user-gender-cla2013.
12https://www.di.unipi.it/ËĲgulli/
13Yahoo! Answers Comprehensive Questions and Answers version 1.0 dataset through the Yahoo! Webscope program.
14Yelp Dataset Challenge in 2015
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system with real-world electronic health records data. Many works target the malware detection
models. [45, 46] performed attack on neural malware detection systems. They used DREBIN dataset
which contains both benigh and malicious android applications [7]. [114] collected benigh windows
application files and used Microsoft Malware Classification Challenge dataset [113] as the malicious
part. [53] crawled 180 programs with corresponding behavior reports from a website for malware
analysis15. 70% of the crawled programs are malware. [98] proposed another kind of attack, called
reprogramming. They specifically targeted the text classification neural models and used four
datasets to evaluate their attack methods: Surname Classification Dataset16, Experimental Data for
Question Classification [76], Arabic Tweets Sentiment Classification Dataset [1] and IMDB movie
review dataset. In [145], the authors modelled the relation extraction as a classification problem,
where the goal is to predict the relations exist between entity pairs given text mentions. They used
two relation datasets: NYT dataset [111] and UW dataset [80]. The work [11] targeted at improving
the efficacy of the neural networks for joint entity and relation extraction. Different to the method
in [145], the authors modelled the relation extraction task as a multi-label head selection problem.
The four datasets are used in their work: ACE04 dataset [28], CoNLL04 EC tasks [115], Dutch Real
Estate Classifieds (DREC) dataset [12], and Adverse Drug Events (ADE) [47].
Machine Translation. Machine Translation works on parallel datasets, one of which uses
source language and the other one is in the target language. [13] used the TED talks parallel corpus
prepared for IWSLT 2016 [89] for testing the NMT systems. They also collected French, German
and Czech corpus for generating natural noises to build a look-up table which contains possible
lexical replacements that later be used for generating adversarial examples. [30] also used the same
TED talks corpus and used German to English, Czech to English, and French to English pairs.
Machine Comprehension. Machine comprehension datasets usually provide context docu-
ments or paragraphs to the machines. Based on the comprehension of the contexts, machine
comprehension models can answer a question. Jia and Liang are one of the first to consider the
textual adversary and they targeted the neural machine comprehension models [55]. They used
the Stanford Question Answering Dataset (SQuAD) to evaluate the impact of their attack on the
neural machine comprehension models. SQuAD is a widely recognised benchmark dataset for
machine comprehension. [142] followed the previous works and also worked on SQuAD dataset.
Althouth the focus of the work [16] is to develop a robust machine comprehension model rather
than attacking MC models, they used the adversarial examples to evaluate their proposed system.
They used MovieQA multiple choice question answering dataset [134] for the evaluation. [21]
targeted attacks on differentiable neural computer (DNC), which is a novel computing machine
with DNN. They evaluated the attacks on logical question answering using bAbI tasks17.
Text Summarization. The goal for text summarization is to summarize the core meaning of a
given document or paragraph with succinct expressions. There is no surveyed papers that only
target the application of text summarization. [24] evaluated their attack on multiple applications
including text summarization and they used DUC200318, DUC200419, and Gigaword20 for evaluating
the effectiveness of adversarial examples.
Text Entailment. The fundamental task of text entailment is to decide whether a premise text
entails a hypothesis, i.e., the truth of one text fragment follows from another text. [57] assessed
15https://malwr.com/
16Classifying names with a character-level rnn - pytroch tutorial.
17https://research.fb.com/downloads/babi/
18http://duc.nist.gov/duc2003/tasks.html
19http://duc.nist.gov/duc2004/
20https://catalog.ldc.upenn.edu/LDC2003T05
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various models on two entailment datasets: Standord Natural Lauguage Inference (SNLI) [17] and
SciTail [59]. [92] also used SNLI dataset. Furthermore, they used MultiNLI [144] dataset.
Part-of-Speech (POS) Tagging. The purpose for POS tagging is to resolve the part-of-speech
for each word in a sentence, such as noun, verb etc. It is one of the fundamental NLP tasks to
facilitate other NLP tasks, e.g., syntactic parsing. Neural networks are also adopted for this NLP task.
[151] adopted the method in [94] to build a more robust neural network by introducing adversarial
training, but they applied the strategy (with minor modifications) in POS tagging. By training on
the mixture of clean and adversarial example, the authors found that adversarial examples not
only help improving the tagging accuracy, but also contribute to downstream task of dependency
parsing and is generally effective in different sequence labelling tasks. The datasets used in their
evaluation include: the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) portion of the Penn Treebank (PTB) [87] and
treebanks from Universal Dependencies (UD) v1.2 [100].
Dialogue Generation. Dialogue generation is a fundamental component for real-world virtual
assistants such as Siri21 and Alexa22. It is the text generation task that automatically generate a
response given a post by the user. [99] is one of the first to attack the generative dialogue models.
They used the Ubuntu Dialogue Corpus [84] and Dynamic Knowledge Graph Network with the
Collaborative Communicating Agents (CoCoA) dataset [49] for the evaluation of their two attack
strategies.
Cross-model Applications. [129] evaluated the OCR systems with adversarial examples using
Hillary Clinton’s emails23, which is in the form of images. They also conducted the attack on NLP
applications using Rotten Tomatoes and IMDB review datasets. The work in [153] attacked the
neural networks designed for scene text rcognition. They conducted experiments on three standard
benchmarks for cropped word image recognition, namely the Street View Text dataset (SVT) [139]
the ICDAR 2013 dataset (IC13) [58] and the IIIT 5K-word dataset (IIIT5K) [93]. [22] attacked the
image captioning neural models. The dataset they used is the Microsoft COCO (MSCOCO) dataset
[79]. [148] worked on the problems of attacking neural models for image captioning and visual
question answering. For the first task, they used Visual Genome dataset [65]. For the second task,
they used the VQA datasets collected and processed in [6]. [125] worked on Visual-Semantic
Embedding applications, where the MSCOCO dataset is used. [19] targeted the speech recognition
problem. The datasets they used is the Mozilla Common Voice dataset24.
Multi-Applications Some works adapt their attack methods into different applications, namely,
they evaluate their method’s trasferability across applications. [24] attacked the sequence-to-
sequence models. Specifically, they evaluated their attack on two applications: text summarization
and machine translation. For text summarization, as mentioned before, they used three datasets
DUC2003, DUC2004, and Gigaword. For the machine translation, they sampled a subset form
WMT’16 Multimodal Translation dataset25. [54] proposed syntactically adversarial paraphrase and
evaluated the attack on sentiment analysis and text entailment applications. They used SST for
sentimental analysis and SICK [88] for text entailment. [156] is a generic approach for generating
adversarial examples on neural models. The applications investigated include image classification
(MINIST digital image dataset), textual entailment (SNLI), and machine translation. [94] evaluated
their attacks on five datasets,covering both sentiment analysis (IMDB movie review, Elec product
review, Rotten Tomatoes movie review) and text categorization (DBpedia Ontology, RCV1 news
articles). [127] targeted two applications. For sentiment analysis, they used Rotten Tomato movie
21https://www.apple.com/au/siri/
22https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amazon_Echo
23https://www. kaggle.com/kaggle/hillary-clinton-emails/data
24https://voice.mozilla.org/en
25http://www.statmt.org/wmt16/translation-task.html
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reviews and IMDB movie reviews datasets. For visual question answering, they tested on dataset
provided by Zhu et al. [157].
5 DEFENSE
An essential purpose for generating adversarial examples for neural networks is to utilize these
adversarial examples to enhance the model’s robustness [42]. There are two common ways in
textual DNN to achieve this goal: adversarial training and knowledge distillation. Adversarial training
incorporates adversarial examples in themodel training process. Knowledge distillationmanipulates
the neural network model and trains a new model. In this section, we introduce some representative
studies belonging to these two directions. For more comprehensive defense strategies on machine
learning and deep leaning models and applications, please refer to [2, 15].
5.1 Adversarial Training
Szegedy et al. [132] invented adversarial training, a strategy that consists of training a neural
network to correctly classify both normal examples and adversarial examples. Goodfellow et al. [42]
employed explicit training with adversarial examples. In this section, we describe works utilizing
data augmentation, model regularization and robust optimization for the defense purpose on textual
adversarial attacks.
5.1.1 Data Augmentation. Data augmentation extends the original training set with the generated
adversarial examples and try to let the model see more data during the training process. Data
augmentation is commonly used against black-box attacks with additional training epochs on the
attacked DNN with adversarial examples.
The authors in work [55] try to enhance the reading comprehension model with training on the
augmented dataset that includes the adversarial examples. They showed that this data augmentation
is effective and robust against the attack that uses the same adversarial examples. However, their
work also demonstrated that this augmentation strategy would be still vulnerable against the
attacks with other kinds of adversarial examples. [142] shared similar idea to augment the training
dataset, but selected further informative adversarial examples as discussed in Section 4.3.1.
The work in [57] trains the text entailment system augmented with adversarial examples. The
purpose is tomake the systemmore robust. They proposed threemethods to generatemore datawith
diverse characteristics: (1) knowledge-based, which replaces words with their hypernym/hyponym
provided in several given knowledge bases; (2) hand-crafted, which adds negations to the the existing
entailment; (3) neural-based, which leverages a seq2seq model to generate an entailment examples
by enforcing the loss function to measure the cross-entropy between the original hypothesis and the
predicted hypothesis. During the training process, they adopt the idea from generative adversarial
network to train a discriminator and a generator, and incorporating the adversarial examples in
the discriminator’s optimization step.
[13] explores another way for data augmentation. It takes the average character embedding as a
word representation and incorporate it into the input. This approach is intrinsically insensitive
to character scrambling such as swap, mid and Rand, thus can resists to noises caused by these
scrambling attacks proposed in the work. However, this defense is ineffective to other attacks that
do not perturb on characters’ orders.
5.1.2 Model Regularization. Model regularization enforces the generated adversarial examples as
the regularizer and follows the form of:
min(J (f (x),y) + λJ (f (x ′),y)) (32)
where λ is a hyperparameter.
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Following [42], the work [94] constructed the adversarial training with a linear approximation
as follows:
− logp(y |x + −ϵд/| |д | |2, ;θ ) (33)
д = ∂x logp(y |x ; θˆ )
where | |д | |2 is the L2 norm regularization, θ is the parameter of the neural model, and θˆ is a constant
copy of θ . The difference to [42] is that, the authors performed the adversarial generation and
training in terms of the word embedding. Further, they extended their previous work on attacking
image deep neural model [95], where the local distribution smoothness (LDS) is defined as the
negative of the KL divergence of two distributions (original data and the adversaries). LDS measures
the robustness of the model against the perturbation in local and ‘virtual’ adversarial direction.
In this sense, the adversary is calculated as the direction to which the model distribution is most
sensitive in terms of KL divergence. They also applied this attack strategy on word embedding and
performed adversarial training by adding adversarial examples as regularizer.
The work [118] follows the idea from [94] and extends the adversarial training on LSTM. The
authors followed FGSM to incorporate the adversarial training as a regularizer. But in order to enable
the interpretability of adversarial examples, i.e., the word embedding of the adversaries should be
valid word embeddings in the vocabulary, they introduced a direction vector which associates the
perturbed embedding to the valid word embedding. [145] simply adopts the regularizer utilized in
[94], but applies the perturbations on pre-trained word embedding and in a different task: relation
extraction. Other similar works that adopt [94] are [11, 118, 145, 151]. We will not cover all these
works in this article, since they simply adopting this method.
5.1.3 Robust Optimisation. Madry et al. [86] cast DNN model learning as a robust optimization
with min-max (saddle point) formulation, which is the composition of an inner non-concave
maximization problem (attack) and an outer non-convex minimization problem (defense). According
to Danskin’s theorem, gradients at inner maximizers correspond to descent directions for the min-
max problem, thus the optimization can still apply back-propagation to proceed. The approach
successfully demonstrated robustness of DNNs against adversarial images by training and learning
universally. [3] adopts the idea and applies on malware detection DNN that handles discrete data.
Their leaning objective is formulated as:
θ ∗ = arдmin
θ
E(x,y)∼D [ max
x ′∈S (x )
L(θ ,x ′,y)] (34)
where S(x) is the set of binary indicator vectors that preserve the functionality of malware x , L is
the loss function for the original classification model, y is the groundtruth label, θ is the learnable
parameters, D denotes the distribution of data sample x .
It is worth noting that the proposed robust optimisation method is an universal framework under
which other adversarial training strategies have natural interpretation. We describe it separately
keeping in view its popularity in the literature.
5.2 Distillation
Papernot et al. [107] proposed distillation as another possible defense against adversarial examples.
The principle is to use the softmax output (e.g., the class probabilities in classfication DNNs) of the
original DNN to train the second DNN, which has the same structure with the original one. The
softmax of the original DNN is also modified by introducing a temperature parameter T :
qi =
exp (zi/T )∑
k exp (zk/T )
(35)
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where zi is input of softmax layer. T controls the level of knowledge distillation. When T = 1, Eq.
(35) turns back to the normal softmax function. If T is large, qi is close to a uniform distribution,
when it is small, the function will output more extreme values. [46] adopts distillation defense for
DNNs on discrete data and applied a high temperature T , as high-temperature softmax is proved
to reduce the model sensitivity to small perturbations [107]. They trained the second DNN with
the augmentation of original dataset and the softmax outputs from the original DNN. From the
evaluations, they found adversarial training is the more effective than distillation. (I like if there is
answers that explains why adversarial training is the more effective than distillation )
6 DISCUSSIONS AND OPEN ISSUES
Generating textual adversarial examples has relatively shorter history than generating image
adversarial examples on DNNs because it is more challenging to make perturbation on discrete
data, and meanwhile preserving the valid syntactic, grammar and semantics. We discuss some of
the issues in this section and provide suggestions on future directions.
6.1 Perceivability
Perturbations in image pixels are usually hard to be perceived, thus do not affect human judgment,
but can only fool the deep neural networks. However, the perturbation on text is obvious, no
matter the perturbation is flipping characters or changing words. Invalid words and syntactic
errors can be easily identified by human and detected by the grammar check software, hence the
perturbation is hard to attack a real NLP system. However, many research works generate such
types of adversarial examples. It is acceptable only if the purpose is utilizing adversarial examples
to robustify the attacked DNN models. In semantic-preserving perspective, changing a word in a
sentence sometimes changes its semantics drastically and is easily detected by human beings. For
NLP applications such as reading comprehension, and sentiment analysis, the adversarial examples
need to be carefully designed in order not to change the should-be output. Otherwise, both correct
output and perturbed output change, violating the purpose of generating adversarial examples. This
is challenging and limited works reviewed considered this constraint. Therefore, for practical attack,
we need to propose methods that make the perturbations not only unperceivable, but preserve
correct grammar and semantics.
6.2 Transferability
Transferability is a common property for adversarial examples. It reflects the generalization of
the attack methods. Transferability means adversarial examples generated for one deep neural
network on a dataset can also effectively attack another deep neural network (i.e., cross-model
generalization) or dataset (i.e., cross-data generalization). This property is more often exploited
in black-box attacks as the details of the deep neural networks does not affect the attack method
much. It is also shown that untargeted adversarial examples are much more transferable than
targeted ones [83]. Transferability can be organized into three levels in deep neural networks: (1)
same architecture with different data; (2) different architectures with same application; (3) different
architectures with different data [154]. Although current works on textual attacks cover both three
levels, the performance of the transferred attacks still decrease drastically compared to it on the
original architecture and data, i.e., poor generalization ability. More efforts are expected to deliver
better generalization ability.
6.3 Automation
Some reviewed works are able to generate adversarial examples automatically, while others cannot.
In white-box attacks, leveraging the loss function of the DNN can identify the most affected
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points (e.g., character, word) in a text automatically. Then the attacks are performed on these
points by automatically modifying the corresponding texts. In black-box attacks, some attacks, e.g.
substitution train substitute DNNs and apply white-box attack strategies on the substitution. This
can be achieved automatically. However, most of the other works craft the adversarial examples in
a manual manner. For example, [55] concatenated manually-chosen meaningless paragraphs to
fool the reading comprehension systems, in order to discover the vulnerability of the victim DNNs.
Many research works followed their way, not aiming on practical attacks, but more on examining
robustness of the target network. These manaul works are time-consuming and impractical. We
believe that more efforts in this line could pass through this barrier in future.
6.4 New Architectures
Although most of the common textual DNNs have gained attention from the perspective of adver-
sarial attack (Section 2.2), many DNNs haven’t been attacked so far. For example, the generative
neural models: Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) and Variational Auto-Encoders (VAEs).
In NLP, they are used to generate texts. Deep generative models requires more sophisticated skill
for model training. This would explain that these techniques have been mainly overlooked by
adversarial attack so far. Future works may consider about generating adversarial examples for
these generative DNNs. Another example is differentiable neural computer (DNC). Only one work
attacked DNC so far [21]. Attention mechanism is somehow become a standard component in most
of the sequential models. But there is no work examined the mechanism itself. Instead, works are
either attack the overall system that contain attentions, or leverage attention scores to identify the
word for perturbation [16].
6.5 Iterative vs One-off
Iterative attacks iteratively search and update the perturbations based on the gradient of the output
of the attacked DNN model. Thus it shows high quality and effectiveness, that is the perturbations
can be small enough and hard to defense. However, these methods usually require long time to
find the proper perturbations, rendering an obstacle for attacking in real-time. Therefore, one-off
attacks are proposed to tackle this problem. FGSM [42] is one example of one-off attack. Natually,
one-off attack is much faster than iterative attack, but is less effective and easier to be defensed
[153]. When designing attack methods on a real application, attackers need to carefully consider
the trade off between efficiency and effectiveness of the attack.
7 CONCLUSION
This article presents the first comprehensive survey in the direction of generating textual adversarial
examples on deep neural networks. We review recent research efforts and develop classification
schemes to organize existing literature. Additionally we summarize and analyze them from different
aspects. We attempt to provide a good reference for researchers to gain insight of the challenges,
methods and issues in this research topic and shed lights on future directions. We hope more robust
deep neural models are proposed based on the knowledge of the adversarial attacks.
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